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Abstract— Current approaches for building
physical unclonable function (PUF) designs resis-
tant to machine learning attacks often suffer from
large resource overhead and are typically difficult
to implement on field programmable gate arrays
(FPGAs). In this paper we propose a new arbiter-
based multi-PUF (MPUF) design that utilises a
Weak PUF to obfuscate the challenges to a Strong
PUF and is harder to model than the conventional
arbiter PUF using machine learning attacks. The
proposed PUF design shows a greater resistance
to attacks, which have been successfully applied
to other Arbiter PUFs. A mathematical model
is presented to analyse the complexity and ob-
fuscation properties of the proposed PUF design.
Moreover, we show that it is feasible to implement
the proposed MPUF design on a Xilinx Artix-
7 FPGA, and that it achieves a good unique-
ness result of 40.60 % and uniformity of 37.03 %,
which significantly improves over previous work
into multi-PUF designs.
1 Introduction
PUFs are a promising lightweight security primi-
tive which use manufacturing process variations to
generate a unique digital fingerprint for an elec-
tronic device, e.g. application-specific integrated cir-
cuits (ASICs) or FPGAs. Since even the manufac-
turer cannot control these variations, PUFs are inher-
ently difficult to clone, providing additional tamper-
evident properties. Since no two PUFs are identical,
the same n−bit input challenge generates a different
n−bit response on different devices. Such a security
primitive provides a number of advantages over cur-
rent state-of-the-art alternatives and allows for higher
security protocols and applications, e.g. key storage
and device authentication.
PUF architectures can be broadly split between
Weak PUF and Strong PUF types based on the size
of their challenge-response pair (CRP) space which
captures the information about the underlying varia-
tion. Weak PUFs have a limited CRP space, and in
the extreme case only having a single output. There-
fore, they are more suited to applications such as key
storage or for seeding a pseudo random number gen-
erator (PRNG), where the response never leaves the
chip and is only accessed as required. In contrast,
Strong PUFs have a large number of possible CRPs,
whereby a large number of random challenges will
return a random response unique to the challenge,
as well as the physical device. By design, this im-
plies a much larger entropy pool. The Arbiter PUF
[1] is one of the most widely studied Strong PUFs.
However, it has been successfully broken by machine
learning based modelling attacks by building up a
linear additive delay model for each bit [2]. While
some researchers have proposed modifications to im-
prove its resistance to modelling attacks, e.g. XOR
Arbiter PUF [3] and lightweight Arbiter PUF [4],
these have also been broken with a sufficient number
of CRPs [5, 6]. To counter this, non-linear Arbiter
PUFs based on voltage transfer characteristic (VTC)
[7] and current mirrors [8] have been proposed specif-
ically to prevent such modelling attacks. However, to
date, these approaches have only been simulated for
ASICs and have not been proven in practice, and they
are not suitable for FPGAs. While Arunkumar et
al. [7] point out the properties that designers should
consider when designing machine learning resistant
PUF designs, a practical and feasible implementa-
tion strategy has still not been proven. Obfuscating
CRPs with some random noise is an efficient method
to make mathematical modelling more complex, such
that it is difficult for modelling attacks to succeed,
e.g. [9, 10]. The tradeoff is that these approaches gen-
erally require additional hardware resources. Siarhei
et al. in [11] also proposed a new method to achieve
increased reliability which has a small hardware and
latency overhead, by removing ”Weak” CRPs.
The concept of combining both Weak and Strong
PUFs in a PUF design to improve the quality of the
overall response has already been presented in pre-
vious work, e.g. [12, 13]. In [13], the authors pro-
posed a composite PUF by using smaller PUFs as
design building blocks to build a larger challenge-
space PUF. However, it exhibits poor uniqueness
results for both ring oscillator (RO) PUF and Ar-
biter PUF (APUF) based composite designs imple-
mented on FPGAs, achieving a uniqueness of less
than 10 % for the APUF (the ideal value for unique-
ness is 50%). Moreover, none of the above multi-PUF
proposals analysed their resistance to modelling at-
tacks. To address the above limitations, we propose
a new arbiter-based lightweight MPUF design which
shows significantly improved resistance to modelling
attacks. More specifically, our scientific research con-
tribution can be summarised as follows:
• We propose a new lightweight PUF design,
MPUF, which utilises Weak PUFs to obfuscate
the challenges to a Strong PUF to enhance its
security against modelling attacks.
• A mathematical model of the proposed MPUF
design is presented and complexity analysis is
provided. Compared to the conventional Arbiter
PUF, the proposed MPUF design has a higher
complexity and, hence, is more difficult to at-
tack.
• A case study based on a combination of a weak
PUF design [14] and the conventional Arbiter
PUF is presented. Two different types of ma-
chine learning based modelling attacks, namely
logistic regression (LR) and covariance matrix
adaptation evolution strategies (CMA-ES), are
utilised to investigate its resistance to modelling
attacks. The experimental results show that the
proposed MPUF achieves a 50% prediction rate
using LR compared to 100% for the conventional
Arbiter PUF. For a 32-bit challenge the CMA-
ES attack also achieves a 100% prediction rate
for the conventional Arbiter PUF, whereas for
the MPUF design, even with a large sample set
of 10,000 CRPs, the prediction rate is less than
80%.
• We validated the proposed MPUF architecture
with 22 designs implemented on Xilinx Artix-
7 FPGAs. An experimental evaluation of this
design shows uniqueness and uniformity results
of 40.60 % and 37.03 % respectively, which are
the best results reported for a multi-puf design
to date, to the best of the authors’ knowledge.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We
present the new lightweight MPUF design in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3 we present a mathematical model
of the proposed MPUF design and compare it to a
conventional Arbiter PUF design. The LR and CMA-
ES modelling attacks of the proposed MPUF design
are discussed in Section 4 and a performance eval-
uation is presented in Section 5. We conclude with
a summary and discussion of our results and future
work in Section 6.
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sign.
2 Proposed MPUF Design
2.1 Architecture of proposed MPUF
design
The proposed MPUF design comprises an array of n
elementary 1-bit cells to generate an n−bit response.
The design of a 1-bit response generation cell is shown
in Figure 1, and is composed of a group of Weak
PUFs and a Strong PUF. The outputs (responses) of
the Weak PUFs are XORed with an n−bit challenge
and the result then forms the challenge for the Strong
PUF.
Hence, the reliability of the Weak PUF is crit-
ical to the performance of the overall MPUF de-
sign. Some types of Weak PUF designs have demon-
strated high reliability with/without post-processing
techniques, e.g. DRAM PUF [15], FPGA based PUF
identification generator [14], etc.. In the next sec-
tion, the previously proposed lightweight and reli-
able PUF ID generator design [14], which we will
refer to henceforth as PicoPUF, is utilised to show
the feasibility of the proposed MPUF. From [14] it
is clear that through pre-processing, the PicoPUF
design can achieve 100% reliability. Generally, any
type of Strong PUF can be utilised to construct the
proposed MPUF design, e.g. Arbiter PUF [1] or FF-
APUF [16]. In this scheme, the challenge to the
Strong PUF is completely obfuscated by the Weak
PUF.
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Figure 2: The PicoPUF design in [17].
2.2 MPUF design with PicoPUF and
an Arbiter PUF
The PicoPUF PUF design, [14, 17], demonstrates
both high reliability and uniqueness, two important
metrics in PUF designs. The design of a 1-bit re-
sponse generation cell is designed to compactly fit
into one FPGA slice, as schematically shown in Fig-
ure 2. It is very lightweight and can be flexibly placed
anywhere in an FPGA. To generate a single bit re-
sponse, two matched time delay paths, T0 and T1,
implemented by two D type flip flops are activated
simultaneously by the rising edge of a START signal
connected to their clock pins after first being reset
by CLEAR; Due to underlying manufacturing pro-
cess variation, the propagation times of the signals
passing through the flip flops are different, thus cre-
ating a race condition between the two delay paths.
Cross-couple NAND gates are used as an arbiter to
decide which signal arrived first, and outputs the re-
sponse as a binary value 0 or 1.
The APUF is one of the best studied Strong PUF
designs, and an example is shown in Figure 3. To
form a 1-bit APUF, two parallel cascaded n−stage
multiplexer (MUX) chains and one flip flop are used.
Two MUXs are constructed as either a cross- or
straight- through connection based on the input chal-
lenge bit. After propagation through the final n−th
stage, the two signals arrive at the cross-coupled
NAND gates which determines which signal arrived
first, and outputs a 1-bit response, either 0 or 1, ac-
cordingly.
The proposed 1-bit MPUF design, as shown in Fig-
ure 4, is composed of n PicoPUF designs and an n-
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Figure 3: The Arbiter PUF design [1].
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Figure 4: The MPUF design based on a PicoPUF
and an Arbiter PUF.
stage APUF design. The response of the ith PicoPUF
is XORed with the challenge bit Ci to mask the orig-
inal challenge bit and a new challenge bit C∗i is gen-
erated. C1, C2, ..., Cn is the challenge input into the
MPUF and C∗1 , C
∗
2 , ..., C
∗
n is the challenge generated
from the PicoPUFs and used by the APUF.
3 Mathematical Model
The proposed MPUF design is composed of the n−
PicoPUF designs [14] and an APUF design. Us-
ing both PicoPUF and APUF models, the proposed
MPUF design model can be described as
∆∗(n) = ~P ∗ · ~d (1)
where, ∆∗(n), the delay difference of the two delay
paths in the APUF in the proposed design, can be
represented as the inner product of the parity vector
~P ∗ and the constant vector ~d = (α1, α2 +β1, ..., αn +
β(n−1), βn). αn and βn can be calculated as shown in
Equation 2 and Equation 3 [18].
αn =
pn − qn − rn + sn
2
(2)
βn =
pn − qn + rn − sn
2
(3)
where, pn, qn, rn and sn are the notations of the delay
segments in each stage of the conventional Arbiter
PUF. The Parity check vector ~P ∗ = (p∗0, p
∗
1, ..., p
∗
n) is
defined as
p∗k =
n∏
i=k+1
Ci ⊕Ki (4)
where, Ki is the output of the i
th PicoPUF design,
and Ci is the i
th bit of the input challenge.
Comparing the mathematical models of both the
conventional APUF [18] by itself and the proposed
MPUF designs, we can see that the proposed MPUF
design demonstrates higher complexity than the con-
ventional APUF since the actual input challenge to
the APUF is obfuscated and masked.
4 Machine Learning Attacks on
Proposed MPUF Design
As mentioned above machine learning based mod-
elling attacks have been shown to expose the vul-
nerability of PUF circuits [2, 5, 6]. Although im-
provements have been suggested to increase their re-
sistance to machine learning attacks, e.g. [3, 19, 4],
these can still be successfully attacked using machine
learning based techniques to build a model, e.g. sup-
port vector machine (SVM), LR, evolutionary strate-
gies (ES), etc.. Currently, the reliability based CMA-
ES attack, proposed by Becker [6], is the most effec-
tive modelling attack against PUFs. It uses repeated
measurements for the same challenge to observe the
reliability of the response bits and then feeds this ob-
servation into a fitness function to find the ’best-fit’
delay parameters.
In this paper the two most widely used machine
learning based algorithms, LR and CMA-ES, are used
to evaluate the proposed MPUF design due to their
effectiveness in modelling Arbiter based PUF archi-
tectures to date.
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biter PUF and proposed MPUF designs by LR at-
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4.1 LR Results
In this experiment, we use an open source implemen-
tation of LR with RProp programmed by Ulrich et
al. [2] in Python, which are available from [20].
To predict the proposed MPUF design using a LR
algorithm, a group of tests on different numbers of
training samples is carried out. Figure 5 shows the
prediction rates for both the conventional APUF and
proposed MPUF designs with training sample sets of
size 3000, 5000, 10000, and 20000, with the separate
test sample data set the same size as the training
one. It can be seen that the conventional APUF can
be successfully predicted with high reliability and the
proposed MPUF demonstrates good resistance to the
LR machine learning attacks.
4.2 CMA-ES Results
For the reliability based CMA-ES algorithm, we fol-
low the work by Becker [6] and the source code in
Matlab is adopted from [21]. A Gaussian distribution
is employed to generate and simulate a group of ran-
dom numbers for the delay elements in the PicoPUF
and the conventional Arbiter PUF. To model the im-
pact of noise a variable is added to the delay differ-
ence of each APUF model with Gaussian distribution
of norm (0, σnoise). An n-XORed APUF(i.e. where
n responses from n different APUFs are XORed) is
evaluated. In this work, a 2-XORed APUF and a
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Figure 6: The prediction rates for conventional Ar-
biter PUF and proposed MPUF designs by CMA-ES
attack.
2-XORed MPUF, XORed 2 responses from 2 differ-
ent APUFs/MPUFs, are evaluated by the CMA-ES
attack. In the modelling attacks, there is an expo-
nential increase in the number of CRPs required with
each additional XOR. Figure 6 shows the prediction
rates for both the conventional 2-XORed APUF and
proposed MPUF designs with training sample sets
of size 100 to 800, and assuming a 6-bit challenge.
It can be seen that the conventional APUF can be
successfully predicted by using 200 training samples
whereas at least 800 are needed to predict the pro-
posed MPUF design.
Figure 7 depicts the prediction rates for both the
conventional APUF and proposed MPUF designs
with training sample sets of size 1000 to 10000, and
assuming a 32-bit challenge. The number of training
samples needed will exponentially grow by increasing
the number of delay stages, i.e. the bit length of the
challenge. For a 32-bit challenge, even with a large
sample set of 10,000 CRPs the prediction rate is less
than 80%. Therefore, it is clear that the proposed
MPUF design will be will be significantly harder to
attack than the conventional APUF for larger chal-
lenges.
5 Performance Evaluation
As the proposed MPUF design exhibits good re-
sistance to LR machine learning attacks, it is also
expected to achieve good PUF design metrics. In
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Figure 7: The prediction rates for conventional Ar-
biter PUF and proposed MPUF designs by CMA-ES
attack.
this paper, the key metrics of uniqueness and unifor-
mity are evaluated. To evaluate these metrics, the
proposed MPUF design is implemented on Digilent
Nexys 4 boards that comprise Xilinx Artix-7 FPGAs.
Two MPUF designs have been implemented on each
of 11 FPGAs producing a total of 22 individual im-
plementations for testing.
5.1 Uniqueness
Uniqueness measures inter-chip variation by evaluat-
ing how well a particular PUF circuit design can be
differentiated between k different devices. Ideally, a
PUF circuit is expected to produce an average inter-
chip hamming distance (HD) of 50% by comparing
the response from two devices supplied with the same
challenge. The uniqueness, representing the average
inter-chip HD, is defined as:
Uniqueness =
2
k(k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
HD(Ri,Rj)
n
× 100
(5)
where, Ri and Rj represent N -bit responses from two
PUF circuits Φi and Φj supplied with the same chal-
lenge C.
Figure 8 shows a histogram of the uniqueness re-
sult for the proposed MPUF design, which has an
empirical mean of 40.6 % and a standard deviation
(STD) of 8 %. This is equivalent to the uniqueness
value of the flip flop based Arbiter PUF (FF-APUF)
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Figure 8: Uniqueness result for proposed MPUF de-
sign.
design [16]. Moreover, compared to the uniqueness
results from 5.44 % to 10.82 %) achieved by previous
work on multi-PUF [13], the proposed MPUF design
demonstrates a significantly higher capability to dif-
ferentiate between different devices.
5.2 Uniformity
Uniformity represents the proportion of zeros and
ones in a PUF response. Ideally it should be 50%,
i.e. half ones and half zeros in a response, making it
difficult for an attacker to guess the response of a par-
ticular device. For device Φi and an N -bit response
the Hamming Weight (HW) percentage is defined in
Equation 6.
HW (Φi) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
Ri,j × 100 (6)
where, Ri,j is the j-th bit of the response from the
i-th device.
The uniformity result for the proposed MPUF de-
sign is shown in Figure 9 and has an empirical mean
of 37.03 % and a standard deviation (STD) of 6.65 %.
The result is equivalent to the uniformity result of
[13]. In future work, these metrics will be evaluated
over a larger sample set.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new MPUF design with
resistance to machine learning attack by using a
Weak PUF to obfuscate the challenge of a Strong
PUF design. A case study is presented by construct-
ing a MPUF using the PicoPUF [14] and a conven-
tional APUF design. Two widely employed machine
learning based attack techniques, LR and CMA-ES,
are utilised to analyse the resistance of the proposed
MPUF design to such attacks. The proposed MPUF
design achieves a 50% prediction rate using the LR
attack compared with 100% for the conventional Ar-
biter PUF design. Using CMA-ES, although the pro-
posed design can be successfully predicted for a small
challenge size, it is still significantly more resistant
to such attacks than the APUF. However, when the
challenge size is increased to just 32 bits the CMA-
ES attack can only achieve a prediction rate of ap-
proximately 80% for the MPUF design, even with
a large sample set of 10,000 CRPs, whereas it can
still achieve a 100% prediction rate for the conven-
tional Arbiter PUF. Two MPUF designs are also
implemented on each of 11 Xilinx Artix-7 FPGAs.
The uniqueness and uniformity metrics for the pro-
posed MPUF design exhibit good results of 40.60 %
and 37.03 % respectively. This significantly improves
upon previous work into multi-PUF and illustrates
the design’s feasibility for implementation on FPGA.
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